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1. Introduction1 
1.1 Relevance 
“We are resilient people. We still believe in human dignity and in a better future for ourselves 
and others. We have a cause, and it is a just cause. I think that the Syrian revolution liber-
ated us from an inferiority complex we had toward the other people of the world. We don’t 
wait for others to solve our problems now, or to define for us what is just and what is fair. We 
are struggling for our emancipation, without illusions.”2  
(Yassin al-Haj Saleh, 3 April 2017) 
The Syrian cause is a just one, indeed. The totalitarian Syrian regime and its security appa-
ratus, which have over decades been enforcing emergency laws, banning public meetings and 
restricting free speech, put any Syrian who might be considered critical of the government at 
the risk of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and torture and death in detention.3 Any 
attempt at political or civic activism has been a dangerous and courageous endeavour, as is 
evident from the crackdown on movements like the Damascus Spring, which evolved after 
Bashar al-Assad assumed Syria’s presidency in 2000.4 Furthermore, the subsequent demands 
for political reforms – the peaceful protests emerging in 2011 also known as the Syrian Revo-
lution – were brutally repressed to an extent that the country has been torn by war ever since.5 
What evolved is the largest displacement crisis since World War II.6 Hence the Syrian cause 
came to mean the protection and support of its (displaced) people and their basic rights.7 Syr-
ians 8  are mainly hosted by their neighbouring countries, while Lebanon is a particularly 
                                               
1 Acknowledgements to Zeina, Lorna, Ameenah & for transnational solidarity. Sincere thanks to the interviewees 
for taking their time and sharing their expertise. Thanks for all the valuable advice of the team of FES, Hozan, Caro 
and more. And to Beirut, for her hospitality with a distinct Syrian flavour. 
2 Yassin al-Haj Saleh, as cited in: Hussain/ Hisham (2016). Yassin al-Haj Saleh is a prominent Syrian intellectual 
and dissident who had been jailed for 16 years as a student activist in Hafez al-Assad’s time, and whose activism 
in the current uprising eventually exiled him to Turkey. cf. ibid.   
3 Cf. Amnesty International (2017); Cambanis (2007); Human Rights Watch (2015). 
4 The Damascus Spring was a movement in which discussion forums, initiated by public political figures, demanded 
political reforms. They emerged when Bashar al-Assad promised reforms, after he assumed the presidency follow-
ing his father’s death. The Damascus Spring introduced the term “civil society” (mujtama’ madani) to Syria. Only 
after a few months, its leaders were arrested and discussion forums were banned. This had the effect that Syrian 
society from then on understood “civil society” as opposed to the regime, and at the same time the regime enforced 
additional repressive measures, even on protests such as against the US-American invasion in Iraq. cf. Khalaf/ 
Ramadan/ Stolleis (2014), pp. 7-8; Pollard (2014), p. 63. 
5 Various warring parties commit war crimes in Syria, with al-Assad’s government and his allies being one of the 
deadliest forces; besieging cities, targeting medical facilities and aid convoys, and using chemical weapons. cf. 
Goldman (2017). 
6 Cf. Reybet-Degat (2016), p. 62. 
7 Therefore, when this paper refers to the Syrian cause, it means these two dimensions; the struggle against a 
totalitarian regime, and the demands to protect and provide for its population in all of the Syrian diaspora. 
8 The term “Syrians” in this paper refers to everyone who identifies as Syrian or a “hyphenated” identity, such as 
Syrian-Palestinian, or who does not identify as Syrian but is a Syrian citizen residing or having resided in Syria and 
is or was therefore subjected to the same circumstances of a repressive state and a brutal war. When referring to 
the “Syrian Community,” this paper mostly means the population of Syrians in Lebanon in direct relation to the civil 
society which represents it, if not specified otherwise as the “larger Syrian community,” which refers the diaspora. 
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interesting case, because both countries have a history of migration and occupation.9 Lebanon 
– a fragile state where one out of four people is a refugee – struggles with the impact of the 
increase in population.10 Its already scarce resources are further strained, having to provide 
for both Syrians and Lebanese, and the refugees’ presence exacerbates the domestic political 
situation.11 When looking to the international community for assistance, Syrians are stalled 
while regional and international political players negotiate over their heads. Although their sit-
uation in Lebanon is a trying one – perhaps particularly because of that – the country witnesses 
the evolution of a new Syrian civil society: By means of civil society organisations (CSOs), 
which can include loose community groups as much as professional non-governmental organ-
isations (NGOs), Syrians can take a stand for their own interests in public life.12 As al-Haj Saleh 
proclaims, Syrians are struggling for their emancipation, and organising themselves in Leba-
nese exile might present an opportunity for them to achieve it. 
1.2 Research Interest and Current State of Research 
As the large-scale displacement of Syrians persists since 2011, plenty of research has been 
done on Syrians in Lebanon. However, much of this is grey literature, especially by civil society, 
think tanks and agencies of the United Nations (UN). Reports conducted by the UN or interna-
tional non-governmental organisations (INGOs) mostly view Syrians solely as refugees, ana-
lysing their vulnerabilities and needs. Other research has been done on the effects of the Syr-
ian presence on the Lebanese economy, labour market and fragile state. The evolution of a 
growing Syrian civil society did not go unnoticed, but mappings and directories do not focus 
on the Lebanese context.13 One extensive mapping by Citizens for Syria e.V. focuses on the 
Syrian civil society inside the country and its neighbouring countries, but its results are hard to 
break down on the Lebanese context only.14 Only newspaper articles and one Master’s thesis 
could be found on Syrian civil society organisations in Lebanon specifically. The thesis by 
Welander mostly focuses on the role these CSOs will play in a future Syria.15 However, both 
Welander and Citizens for Syria e.V. provide valuable quantitative data and identify challenges 
posed to Syrian CSOs. Welander and sources like Mansour and Harling, Simon and Berthier 
have discussed how the international community and its donor regime fail local civil society 
                                               
9 Syria hosted Lebanese refugees after the Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975, and Syrian troops entered the 
country as part of a peacekeeping mission. The troops ended up staying in Lebanon for 25 years, even after the 
war ended in 1990, continuously being in control of the Lebanese government. cf. The New York Times (2005). 
10 Cf. Girard (2016), p. 11; Reybet-Degat (2016), p. 62. 
11 Cf. ibid. 
12 This definition was adapted by the official definition of civil society by the World Bank: Civil society refers “to the 
wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the 
interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philan-
thropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: com-
munity groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, 
faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations.” cf. The World Bank (2013). 
13 Cf. Citizens for Syria. e.V. (2015); Hamzet Wasel (2017). 
14 Cf. Citizens for Syria e.V. (2015). 
15 Cf. Welander (2015). 
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actors.16 Therefore this research aims to focus on the resilience of Syrian CSOs in Lebanon 
by bringing out their strategies in overcoming these challenges. Furthermore, no recent litera-
ture could be found on the effects of the 2015 large-scale migration to Europe on Syrian CSOs 
in Lebanon, so another focus of this research is to analyse how they experience migration. 
Hence, this paper considers all the aforementioned research as a background, and aims to 
contribute something new by considering Syrians in Lebanon as agents of their own cause:  
The purpose of this paper is to analyse Syrian civil society organisations with regards to the 
conditions under which they operate and the identities, shapes, human resources, and strate-
gies they adopt in the face of these circumstances. 
1.3 Structure of the Paper 
The first part of this paper gives a theoretical background of reasons for nonprofit organisations 
(NPOs) to emerge and of the roles they take.17 To explain the emergence of Syrian civil society 
organisations in Lebanon, this chapter details the failures of the Lebanese market and state, 
of the international community and the non-profit sector in the Syrian-Lebanese context. By 
identifying the needs of Syrians in Lebanon that remain unmet, it suggests which roles their 
civil society organisations might take. The paper then goes on to define what qualifies as a 
Syrian civil society organisation in Lebanon and verifies which of the suggested roles are ac-
tually assumed by Syrian CSOs in Lebanon through giving a basic quantitative overview and 
typology of the sector.  
The main body of the paper begins with chapter 4; thoroughly examining the political, legal, 
economic, and societal context in which these Syrian CSOs operate. Chapter 5 then goes on 
to discuss how the nine organisations interviewed for this research operate under the afore-
mentioned circumstances, which identities and shapes they assume and of which human re-
sources they are constituted. The analysis puts special attention on the many original strate-
gies identified throughout the interviews, which the CSOs use to overcome challenges they 
are presented with, and on the capacities they build among Syrians in Lebanese exile. After 
discussing the interviewees’ visions for the future of their organisations, concluding remarks 
will summarise the main findings, reflect on the research, and suggest potential scenarios of 
Syrian civil society in Lebanon. 
                                               
16 Cf. ibid; Mansour (2017); Harling/ Simon/ Berthier (2017). 
17 The terms nonprofit organisation and non-governmental organisation will be used interchangeably in this paper, 
unless pointed out differently. 
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2. Methodology 
The theoretical background of this paper is based on core third sector theories which are then 
applied to the Syrian-Lebanese context, derived from literature review. This review relies on 
grey literature such as newspaper articles and civil society reports, as it references current 
events and developments. Subsequently, a quantitative overview and typology of Syrian CSOs 
in Lebanon has been drafted by consulting different civil society sources. These non-academic 
publications, such as directories and mappings, use different parameters and diverge severely 
in their findings, as the very new Syrian civil society is subject to constant development. In 
spite of its very limited validity, this quantitative data was included to give a basic idea of the 
size and scope of the sector and identify certain tendencies. 
The main body of the paper is based on the conduct and analysis of nine qualitative interviews. 
The interviews have all been conducted with representatives and former employees of Syrian 
CSOs operating in Lebanon in October and November of 2017 in Beirut, Lebanon. The nine 
interviewed organisations were chosen based on field research in Beirut within the Syrian 
CSOs’ network, with the aim to cover a range of fields of activity, geographical scopes, legal 
forms and degrees of formality. Former employees were included as they still present valuable 
input on the sector and can elaborate especially on the factors of migration and turnover. As 
the context is a very sensitive one, and in order to allow confidential information to be shared, 
the anonymity of the interviewees and their organisations has been preserved.  
The interviews were explorative, open-ended and semi-structured. Guiding questions were 
established on the basis of desk-based research of the Lebanese and international context in 
which (Syrian) CSOs manoeuvre. The interviews aimed to identify which of these context fac-
tors are most decisive to the CSOs, which were then thoroughly examined in chapter 4 by 
means of a literature review. The interviews intended to better understand the variety of iden-
tities and shapes assumed by Syrian CSOs under these conditions. Interviewees were given 
the chance to elaborate extensively on the topics most significant to them, while an emphasis 
was put on the CSOs’ human resources in the Syrian-Lebanese context of displacement and 
migration. The research does not mean to be representative of the whole sector due to the 
limited sample size, but rather to identify trends. 
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3. Emergence and Extent of Syrian Civil Society in Lebanon 
3.1 Responsibilities for Syrian Needs in Lebanon 
3.1.1 Failures of the Lebanese Market and State 
The theories of market and state failure imply that NPOs emerge as service providers in order 
to fill gaps which are left by market as well as state.18 In Lebanon, services like shelter, health 
and education are largely privatised.19 This means that market mechanisms would ensure their 
distribution. However, the Lebanese market entails exclusive agencies and de-facto oligopo-
lies while it lacks a strong judicial system law to regulate competition and cartel agreements.20 
Additionally, markets can fail when consumers mistrust offers from private suppliers as there 
is an information asymmetry about the quality of services.21 This applies especially to consum-
ers in precarious situations, such as refugees, who are in danger of being exploited for profit 
maximisation. As Lebanon has been struggling with increasing living costs since before 2011, 
this is aggravated by the additional demand of Syrians with very limited means. Prices of low-
income housing, food, medicine, water and fuel have been increasing constantly, while Syrians 
face poor service quality and harassment.22 To meet their basic needs, many deplete their 
savings and contract debts to such an extent that by the end of 2015the percentage of Syrian 
households living below the poverty line had reached 70%.23 In this vulnerable position, fami-
lies might turn towards negative coping mechanisms, taking children out of school for child 
labour and marriage.24 
In the face of this limited economic power, entering the labour market to improve their living 
conditions presents a convincing step for many Syrians in Lebanon. However, the Lebanese 
government heavily restricts Syrians’ access to the labour market to prevent labour competition 
and not least because having a job can encourage refugees to stay even after their need for 
protection from conflict has ended.25 Such restraint causes Syrians to work unskilled jobs in 
the informal sector, where they earn significantly less than the national minimum wage even 
though they tend to work more hours per week than Lebanese.26 Keeping Syrians from provid-
ing for themselves means that the Lebanese government needs to secure their access to 
                                               
18 Cf. Salamon (1987), p. 35. 
19 70 percent of Lebanese children attend private schools and over 86 percent of hospital beds are privately owned. 
cf. Culbertson/ Oliker/ Baruch/ Blum (2016), p. 35. 
20 Cf. Raman (2016), p. 14. 
21 Cf. Salamon (1987), p. 36. 
22 Cf. International Labour Organization Regional Office for the Arab States (2014), p. 39; United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees/ United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2014), pp. 7-8. 
23 Cf. Errighi/ Griesse (2016), p. 20; Girard (2016), p. 11; Raman (2016), p. 11. 
24 Cf. Chatty (2016), p. 58; Reybet-Degat (2016), p. 62. 
25 Cf. Frangieh (2016), p. 40. 
26 50 hours per week for Syrian male workers against the 48 hours average for Lebanese. The average monthly 
income for Syrian refugee workers was at LBP 418,000, the national minimum wage at LBP 675,000. cf. Errighi/ 
Griesse (2016), p. 20; Raman (2016), pp. 10-11. 
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affordable basic goods and services another way. However, Lebanon has one of the world’s 
highest national debt ratios.27 The country’s already limited resources such as water and sew-
age facilities or education and healthcare services have been further strained by the refugees’ 
demand.28 Failure of the Lebanese state to provide services to meet the increased demand is 
what the original state failure theory by Weisbrod specifies as a quantitative shortage. The 
needs are identified but cannot be met due to insufficient means.29 To meet these pressing 
demands, the Lebanese government needs to request funding from the international commu-
nity.30 
Beyond a shortage in provision of services and goods, the Lebanese state lacks an effective 
legal framework for asylum, not least as it has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention.31 It 
adopts minimal and inconsistent protection measures; suspending deportations, yet tolerating 
temporary stay only on the condition of resettlement.32 Through this form of tolerance, Syrian 
refugees are kept in a precarious state: More than half of them cannot renew their residence 
permits, which are issued only on a short-term basis and unsystematically, and the threat of 
arrest and deportation is upheld.33 Exclusionary and dehumanising policies create an anti-Syr-
ian climate and keep refugees from integrating into host communities.34 Such strategies are 
used as a deterrent against potential refugees and an incentive for the international community 
to advance resettlement.35 In a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR), Lebanon has shifted the responsibility to protect refugees to the United 
Nations.36 Through this alternative protection regime the Lebanese state assumes basic re-
sponsibilities on the condition of passing the long-term responsibility to the international com-
munity. 37 Meanwhile, Lebanon does not sufficiently protect refugees and their rights and strug-
gles to both provide for them and to prevent the market from exploiting them both as consum-
ers and as cheap labour. 
3.1.2 Failures of the International Community of States 
War-torn Syria and the concomitant large-scale displacement of Syrians call for transnational 
assistance. The UN is the supranational body which, on behalf of the international community, 
helps “parties in conflict make peace; […] and creating the conditions to allow peace to hold 
                                               
27 Lebanon’s debt is the world’s third highest in terms of debt-to-GDP ratio. cf. Barrington (2017). 
28 Cf. International Labour Organization Regional Office for the Arab States (2014), p. 39. 
29 Cf. Weisbrod (1977), as cited in: Badelt/ Pennerstorfer (2013), p. 109.  
30 $2.48 billion in the 2016 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan. cf. Girard (2016), p. 11. 
31 Cf. Frangieh (2016), p. 37. 
32 UNHCR has stopped registering Syrian refugees in May 2015 as Lebanon prohibited them to do so. cf. Frangieh 
(2016), pp. 38-39, 42. 
33 Cf. Frangieh (2016), pp. 39-40; Girard (2016), p. 12. 
34 Cf. Chatty (2016), p. 58. 
35 Cf. Frangieh (2016), p. 39. 
36 Cf. ibid. pp. 37-38. 
37 Cf. Frangieh (2016), p. 43. 
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and flourish.”38 However, the ineffective UN Security Council and failed diplomatic attempts to 
end or even defuse the war leave Syrians disillusioned and without trust in the international 
community’s protection.39 On top of that, the UN has lost credibility of its impartiality in the 
Syrian cause, as UN agencies in Syria were reported to employ and award procurement con-
tracts to regime affiliates in 2016.40 Another of the UN’s purposes is to coordinate “humanitar-
ian relief operations […] in areas beyond the relief capacity of national authorities alone.”41 As 
such, UNHCR in the above mentioned MoU accepts the obligation to resettle Syrians, whereas 
implementing this relies on the willingness of the individual states which fail to provide enough 
visa and family reunification opportunities.42 Instead, UNHCR’s focus is on providing humani-
tarian assistance to Syrian refugees in the main three hosting countries Lebanon, Turkey and 
Jordan, not least to keep them within the region.43 However, the billions of US dollars of finan-
cial aid provided by the international community still remain insufficient and unstable.44 As an 
example, when in 2015 a deficit in funding severely reduced the output of food e-vouchers, 
many Syrians in Lebanon were left impoverished to a degree that made them lose faith and 
leave the region as a last resort.45 
Hence, the international community avoids putting real efforts into political solutions on national 
and international levels and instead takes the easier and cheaper route by viewing the Syrian 
crisis solely through a humanitarian lens.46 As refugees, with or without status, Syrians do not 
have voting power neither in Lebanon nor on an international level. Their limited political power 
and exclusion from decision-making give both Lebanon and donor states little reason to con-
sider their input when determining how to respond to their needs. While the international com-
munity does assume responsibility in the face of the shortcomings of the Lebanese state, it is 
mostly responding to socio-economic needs as established in the MoU.47 This constitutes a 
qualitative state failure on their side, which is specified as an unmet heterogeneity in demand.48 
It does not cover the full range of Syrian refugees’ needs, such as demands for protection and 
a political solution, and leaves out certain demographic groups by focusing on the most vul-
nerable and other groups that match its own agenda.49 Additionally, its humanitarian system 
                                               
38 UN (2017) 
39 Cf. Reybet-Degat (2016), p. 62. 
40 Cf. Mansour (2017), p. 14. 
41 UN (2017) 
42 Cf. Girard (2016), p. 12; Frangieh (2016), p. 39; Reybet-Degat p. 64. 
43 Cf. Chatty (2016), p. 57. 
44 Cf. Girard (2016), p. 11. 
45 Cf. Reybet-Degat (2016), p. 63. 
46 Cf. Mansour (2017), pp. 9, 14. 
47 Cf. Frangieh (2016), p. 40. 
48 Cf. James (1987), as cited in: Badelt/ Pennerstorfer (2013), p. 109. 
49 Davis argues that the term vulnerability is gendered, primarily considering groups such as female-headed house-
holds while for instance the fact that many Syrian non-combatant men are fleeing forced conscription does not 
influence donor policies. cf. Davis (2016), pp. 49, 54. 
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has been criticised for being too complex and centralised.50 Therefore the UN’s response is 
fragmentary and calls for a more thorough implementation. 
Market and state failure can give rise to NPOs to fill gaps, but they can just as well be the 
preferred choice to supply goods or services, as is argued by Salamon’s theory of Third-Party 
Government: States can avert their failure through partnerships with NPOs, providing funds to 
them to have goods and services delivered.51 Indeed, for several decades the international 
donor community has increasingly preferred subcontracting to NPOs during humanitarian cri-
ses.52 Salamon suggests that priorities in spending resources are ideally determined by a dem-
ocratic political process while the actual implementation is done by a less bureaucratic entity 
in the field. In theory, service provision can become more efficient through competition over 
public funds while the partnerships involve blended roles and shared responsibilities that can 
cause problems of accountability and control.53 Indeed, the UN-led humanitarian system’s very 
own personnel has criticised it as a competition over limited resources of international govern-
mental and non-governmental players with different agendas that leads to power struggles, a 
lack of coordination and inefficiencies.54 It leaves quantitative shortages, owed to limited re-
sources of donor countries and qualitative shortages due to donors’ limited perspectives and 
own political interests. Both gaps are responded to by even more NPOs without UN mandates. 
How this vast landscape of nonprofit actors in Lebanon – subsidiaries and substitutes of the 
international community – still fails Syrians there will be analysed hereafter.  
3.1.3 Failures of the Nonprofit Sector 
The Three-Failures Theory suggests that the nonprofit sector is not the ultimate solution to 
market and government failure. It introduces the idea of voluntary failure, which has been 
specified by Salamon as philanthropic insufficiency, particularism, paternalism and amateur-
ism. Philanthropic insufficiency addresses the limitation of resources which an NPO can gen-
erate by itself, resulting in inadequate, unreliable and fragmentary provision of resources. Phil-
anthropic particularism means the failure to target the segments of a community which are not 
adequately represented in the NPO or not favoured by those in control of resources. This can 
result in selective responses to needs and also in inefficient duplication of services and waste 
of resources. Philanthropic paternalism implies that NPOs might respond to community needs 
in a patronising way; upholding the concept of charity and creating dependency. It also de-
scribes the decrease of democratic legitimation of third sector organisations, as a growing 
need for professionalism moves decision-making power from the community of volunteers and 
                                               
50 Cf. Mansour (2017), p. 10. 
51 Cf. Salamon (1987), p. 38. 
52 Cf. Makoba (2002). 
53 Cf. Salamon (1987), p. 38. 
54 Cf. Mansour (2017), pp. 8, 16. 
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members to those in control of resources.55 All of these aspects of non-profit failure are well-
established points of criticism of NPOs working with Syrians in Lebanon: Funds are insufficient 
and lead to rivalry among NPOs, which implement overlapping short-term programmes instead 
of creating synergies.56 Surfing the donors’ agenda, programmes leave segments of the Syrian 
community uncared for, as described before, and might be abruptly halted when that agenda 
changes.57 A lack of Syrian voices in the international aid and development system contributes 
to a reliance on Western perspectives, which confirm the paternalistic concerns of the service 
providers instead of the beneficiaries.58 
Lastly, philanthropic amateurism describes the dilettantism that is attributed to NPOs as they 
are associated with unprofessional volunteerism and meagre financial power to acquire quali-
fied staff.59 This last point is not the case with the overly professionalised international NPOs, 
which are criticised by Syrians in Lebanon as being detached from the actual programme im-
plementation and are perceived to be wasteful and corrupt.60 Local Lebanese NPOs are sup-
posedly closer to the field, yet Lebanon’s third sector has been operating in the international 
humanitarian system for decades and is inclined to reproduce the same shortcomings.61 Some 
Syrians consider Lebanese NPOs’ commitment to the Syrian cause as mainly economically 
opportunistic; surfing the donors’ agenda to create workplaces for Lebanese.62 Whether these 
perceptions are true or not, they show Syrians’ distrust in international and Lebanese NPOs. 
All of their failures, in addition to the failures of the Lebanese market and state and of the 
international community, give Syrians reason to respond themselves to their own community’s 
needs, to want their whole community democratically represented in the organisations, and to 
depend on themselves for reliable resources. To conclude the analysis of why Syrian CSOs 
emerged in Lebanon, the last chapter of the theoretical background will look into the roles they 
might assume under these circumstances.  
3.1.4 Potential Roles for Syrian Civil Society Organisations in Lebanon 
The theoretical framework consulted in this chapter is commonly used to analyse NPOs as 
service providers. Thus many of the aforementioned failures of the Lebanese market and state, 
the international community and nonprofit sector suggest that a Syrian civil society in Lebanon 
primarily emerges in response to the unmet socio-economic needs of Syrian refugees there. 
However, Walcher suggests that this allocative function of NPOs has to be complemented by 
a socially and politically integrative function: NPOs can stabilise civil society, activate it socially 
                                               
55 Cf. Salamon (1987), pp. 39-41. 
56 Cf. Mansour (2017), p. 17. 
57 Cf. ibid. 
58 Cf. Chatty (2016), p. 57. 
59 Cf. Salamon (1987), p. 42. 
60 Cf. Topham Smallwood (2014), p. 22. 
61 Cf. Beyond Reform & Development/ Transtec (2015), p. 120. 
62 Cf. Interviewee A. 
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and politically, facilitate participation in public discourse and defend its interests through advo-
cacy and political lobbying.63 Strachwitz also extends the roles of associations that the Euro-
pean Commission lists and ends up with six more roles that CSOs assume beyond service 
provision: advocacy, watchdog, intermediary, self-help, community building and political delib-
eration.64 Indeed, this chapter also established other necessities of Syrians displaced to Leb-
anon: They need protection and security in their hosting country and a peaceful solution in 
Syria in order to return home – cause for advocacy on national, regional and international 
levels. Being at the mercy of political players and an international humanitarian aid regime 
could give occasion to establish watchdog initiatives monitoring them. A growing number of 
Syrian CSOs can be a reason to establish intermediary organisations such as umbrella groups 
to network and coordinate, or grant-making institutions to create their own source of funding.  
Naturally, organisations can take on more than one role and some could be considered meta-
roles of organisations fulfilling other purposes. For instance, self-help might be inherent to 
grassroots initiatives originating from within a community to respond to its own needs. A CSO 
can be community-building because it brings people together for even the most mundane lei-
sure activity, as Strachwitz argues.65 Such new collectives, regardless how informal, can cre-
ate a feeling of belonging and ownership where geographical communities do not and prompt 
citizens to interact, collaborate and communicate, thus developing social capital.66 This is es-
pecially relevant in the context of displacement, where original communities have been dis-
rupted and reassembled, people need support systems, and tensions with host communities 
are prevalent. Strachwitz also argues that any casual CSO can be a centre of political activity 
and civic spirit.67 In Syria, civil society has indeed been understood as a political opposition to 
the government and dominant military.68 Since this type of political activism is heavily restricted 
inside the country, exile could be a chance for Syrian organisations to pursue it and publicly 
take a stand in the politically charged Syrian context. Hence, Syrian CSOs have reason to fill 
several potential roles: After the primary state failure of the Syrian Arab Republic denying them 
peace, security and human rights and putting them in the perilous position to have to seek 
refuge in other countries, they experience a lack of protection and support there, too. The 
following chapter will give an overview of which Syrian CSOs actually emerged in Lebanon 
and which roles they assume, after establishing their definition. 
                                               
63 Cf. Walcher (1997), pp. 24-25. 
64 Cf. Strachwitz (2014), p. 22. 
65 Cf. Strachwitz (2014), p. 23. 
66 Cf. ibid. 
67 Cf. ibid. 
68 Cf. Khalaf/ Ramadan/ Stolleis (2014), p. 7. 
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3.2 Scope of Syrian Civil Society Organisations in Lebanon 
3.2.1 Definition of Syrian Civil Society Organisations in Lebanon 
To determine which organisations evolved from the above-described circumstances, Syrian 
CSOs in Lebanon need to be defined more closely for the purpose of this research. As most 
of them emerged in uncertain and insecure circumstances – inside a country torn by war or a 
country of asylum – their legal status and varying degrees of formality will be of secondary 
importance to their nature. Hence, in this research the term CSO will describe any type of 
nonprofit and non-governmental association, from informal community initiatives to profes-
sional NPOs. The “Syrianness” of these organisations can be discerned in different aspects. 
As will be established later, registration, management and employment are delicate aspects 
for Syrians in Lebanon and will therefore in this research not be relevant in defining their or-
ganisations. Instead, an organisation will be considered part of Syrian civil society, for one, 
when it works on the Syrian cause, as defined before, and entails targeting mainly Syrian ben-
eficiaries. Further, it will only be considered Syrian if it also originated from the larger Syrian 
community, in that its founder(s) and most human resources – including volunteers – are from 
within Syria and its diaspora, which entails “hyphenated” identities like Syrian-Lebanese. 
Lastly, it needs to be specified which organisations are considered to be located in Lebanon, 
which will be any Syrian CSO that has its administration and/or its operational activities inside 
the country. This includes organisations which originated elsewhere but respond to the needs 
in Lebanon, and organisations which respond to needs inside Syria but manage their activities 
from Lebanon, for the reason that both types are subject to the specific conditions of the Leb-
anese context to a certain extent. Hence, for the purpose of this research a Syrian civil society 
organisation in Lebanon shall be defined as any distinctly Syrian – meaning in purpose, ben-
eficiaries and human resources – non-governmental and nonprofit association that operates 
in Lebanon either on a management or on a project level. 
3.2.2 Quantitative Overview and Typology 
To give an overview of Syrian CSOs in Lebanon, three registers were consulted: one mapping 
of Syrian civil society by the Syrian CSO Citizens for Syria e.V., one online directory of institu-
tions working in and for Syria called Rawabet, and one Master’s thesis by Welander on Syrian 
CSOs in Lebanon specifically.69 They all collected their data in 2015 and 2016 but approached 
the mapping differently, not necessarily academic, and applied varying parameters of what 
69 Citizens for Syria e.V. is based in Berlin and has done periodical mappings through on-site field research in Syria 
and its neighbouring countries. Hamzet Wasel, a Syrian CSO, offers the Rawabet online directory of institutions 
working in and for Syria and the Syrian CSOs in Lebanon could be identified when choosing the parameters “Leb-
anon” and “National Civil Society Organization”. Welander has written their Master’s thesis on Syrian civil society 
in Lebanon and identified organisations by doing field research. cf. Citizens for Syria e.V. (2015); Hamzet Wasel 
(2017); Welander (2015). 
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constitutes a Syrian CSO in Lebanon. After crossing out overlapping findings of these three, 
72 Syrian CSOs in Lebanon could be identified.70 However, due to unreliability of data and the 
unsteadiness of the context these constitute no definite overview, but give an approximate idea 
of the extent of the Syrian CSO landscape in Lebanon. As only the mapping by Citizens for 
Syria e.V. categorises all its findings, a basic typology has been conducted for this research 
on the basis of the 39 organisations which that mapping identified in Lebanon.71 Judging by 
the findings of the other mappings, this quantitative analysis is limited because it shows only 
a fragment of Syrian CSOs in Lebanon. However, it allows a basic overview to give an idea of 
the fields of the sector and its size in relation to Syrian civil society in total. 
Out of the total 802 Syrian CSOs identified by Citizens for Syria e.V. only 4.9% are in Lebanese 
exile.72 Only half of these have their headquarters there (46%), the others are branches of 
Syrian CSOs originated elsewhere.73 This suggests that a comparatively small share of Syrian 
CSOs is in Lebanon, of which some are there solely to direct their activities inside Syria.74 With 
regards to fields of work, the mapping categorised organisations based on the International 
Classification for Non-Profit Organizations which they expanded to fit the Syrian context. For 
this research, the activities ascribed to the mapping’s 39 identified organisations75 were re-
evaluated to examine which roles Syrian CSOs in Lebanon actually assume, in response to 
the needs that have been established in the previous chapter, and categorised in the afore-
mentioned seven roles: 
Figure 1: Fields of Work of Syrian Civil Society Organisations in Lebanon in absolute numbers. Own 
categorisation and illustration based on Citizens for Syria e.V. (2017a).  
70 Cf. Appendix 1, pp. 42-43. 
71 Cf. Appendix 2, pp. 44-45. 
72 Comparing between Syria’s neighbouring countries, Turkey has more than three times as many Syrian CSOs as 
Lebanon, but Jordan has less than a quarter of the ones in Lebanon. cf. Citizens for Syria e.V. (2015), pp. 25, 31. 
73 Cf. Citizens for Syria e.V. (2017a). 
74 Cf. ibid. 
75 Cf. Appendix 2, pp. 44-45. 
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Figure 1 shows the absolute majority of organisations providing services (76.9%), which in-
clude mostly education, housing, social and health services – responses to mainly socio-eco-
nomic needs ranging from emergency relief to developmental approaches. The second-largest 
domain is the rather ambiguous political deliberation (25.6%).76 This label was chosen to com-
prise organisations’ activities like research and political education on issues of civil and human 
rights, gender, law, democracy, transitional justice and peace-building.77 While such activities 
have been restricted inside the country first by the Syrian regime and further by the armed 
conflict, proportions of politically active organisations in Lebanon are not clearly higher com-
pared to those active inside Syria.78 Still, only a minority of Syrian CSOs in Lebanon (12.8%) 
defends Syrian interests through advocacy and also does this as only a secondary field. Or-
ganisations classified as intermediary (15.4%) do networking and coordination among the Syr-
ian CSOs, while one of them is grant-making. No organisations can specifically be counted as 
community-building, as the mapping did not give information on services like community cen-
tres, but qualitative analysis will later on challenge this finding. Based on the organisations’ 
listed activities, none could be specifically identified as watchdogs or self-help organisations, 
but some might fill these meta-roles. Several organisations cover more than one field, but only 
two offer both services and advocacy or political activities.79 This basic, albeit limited overview 
suggests that Syrian civil society in Lebanon mainly responds to socio-economic needs of 
displaced Syrians in Lebanon and in Syria. A larger share also engages in political activities 
inside the community – possibly responding to the restraint of such opportunities inside Syria 
and the infringement of Syrians’ basic rights in Lebanon – but noticeably little importance is 
placed on advocacy or the watchdog role. To get a better understanding of why Syrian CSOs 
in Lebanon assume which roles, and in preparation for the analysis of the identities, shapes 
and strategies they assume, the next chapter will examine the circumstances under which they 
operate in the Lebanese-international context. 
76 Cf. Figure 1, p. 13. 
77 Workshops concerning political education and discussion are not counted as services provided, but as political 
deliberation to put an emphasis on their political nature. 
78 Territories inside Syria vary in how restrictive their environment is depending on whether they are controlled by 
the regime, the opposition, Kurdish Forces, or ISIS. Hence, Lebanon is not per se a more enabling environment for 
political activities than Syria, but surely when compared to certain areas inside Syria. cf. Citizens for Syria e.V. 
(2015), pp. 26-31. 
79 Cf. Citizens for Syria e.V. (2017a). 
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4. Circumstances of Syrian Civil Society Organisations in Lebanon 
4.1 Political Context 
In a field of national and transnational interest, various dimensions of politics influence the 
CSOs working on the Syrian context in Lebanon. The Lebanese government’s power sharing 
agreement aims to guarantee certain stability by representing all ethnic and religious groups 
of the country’s population.80 However, this is susceptible to imbalance as the Lebanese polit-
ical elite is divided in their stance on Syria, to the extent that Hezbollah, a political party in the 
Lebanese parliament, is involved in the war in Syria as an ally to the Syrian regime’s army.81 
This further politicises the Syrian presence in Lebanon and contributes to the aggravation of 
the national security situation:82 There are reports of Lebanon’s General Security Office, his-
torically affiliated with the Syrian regime, arbitrarily arresting Syrian refugees and especially 
Syrians opposed to al-Assad’s regime still feel observed by its security apparatus even in Leb-
anon.83 To avoid further polarisation, the Lebanese state needs Syrian life in Lebanon to be 
apolitical. While freedom of speech and assembly are guaranteed, the latter has recently been 
suspended when pro-Syrian (and their counter-) demonstrations have been banned for fear of 
violent clashes.84 In order to marginalise the Syrian presence, the Lebanese state shifted from 
its “open door” guideline to a more hostile stance, calling the Syrian presence an “existential 
threat”.85 With this type of rhetoric and the tolerance of discriminatory policies,86 it manifests 
its vision to be nothing more than a transitory country for Syrians. 
This is especially critical in light of the international community’s agenda of keeping Syrians 
mainly in their neighbouring countries.87 In order to present fast progress to their constituen-
cies, international donor countries often choose the easier and cheaper route of funding relief 
programmes rather than investing time and effort in political action, as mentioned earlier.88 A 
mostly symptom-oriented humanitarian response stalls Syrians, makes them dependent and 
inhibits their self-reliance.89 This approach does little to empower Syrians and to get them out 
of this passivity. Instead, the international community’s response is shaped by its member 
                                               
80 Cf. Dionigi (2016), p. 12.  
81 Cf. ibid. pp.12, 17-18. 
82 Cf. Cherri/ Arcos González/ Castro Delgado (2016), p. 169. 
83 Cf. Mansour (2017), p. 6; Interviewee I. 
84 The demonstrations originated from the death and alleged torture of four Syrian refugees by Lebanese army 
soldiers, following suicide attacks during an army raid in a Syrian refugee camp. The protest ban seems to be 
politically motivated, as protests regarding other issues were tolerated. cf. Wood (2017); Porter/ Chehayeb (2017). 
85 President Michel Suleiman, in March 2014, shifted from defining the situation as an “existential crisis” to “exis-
tential threat” to Lebanon. cf. Dionigi (2016), pp. 17, 20. 
86 In over 40 municipalities illegal night curfews and vigilantism keep Syrians from going out at night or mixing with 
Lebanese. cf. Chatty (2016), p. 58. 
87 Cf. Harling/ Simon/ Berthier (2017). 
88 Cf. Mansour (2017), p. 8. 
89 Cf. Frangieh (2016), p. 42; Harling/ Simon/ Berthier (2017); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/ 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2014), p. 6. 
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states’ various mandates and competing geopolitical agendas.90 Thus concepts like “counter-
ing violent extremism” or “stabilization” appear on the agenda but remain little more than 
buzzwords for western actors.91 Programmes are designed on the basis of paternalistic as-
sumptions of realities on the ground, and lobbying for these international priorities to change 
takes a huge amount of effort and time. Even though this donor regime is itself politicised, it 
demands neutrality of its partner organisations in the field.92 Political sensibilities of donors as 
well as the Lebanese state and the impartiality they dictate fail to support any communities 
and projects which are politically active or affiliated. They demand that these organisations 
distance themselves and their work from events in Syria and also from the spirit of the Syrian 
uprising.93 Again, Syrians are kept in deadlock of what they are able to do in Lebanon. 
4.2 Legal Context 
The neutrality demanded by national and international politics is reflected in the legal frame-
work for CSOs in Lebanon. While the process of registration is fairly simple, it can be subject 
to arbitrary duration and scrutiny to get the approval and receive the registration number, which 
is needed to open a bank account. This vagueness contributes to the widespread perception 
that registering a CSO is time-consuming and work-intensive.94 The Lebanese Associations 
Law does not cover certain controversial activities or topics, so approving these organisations 
is left to the discretion of the Ministry of Interior.95 This, coupled with the random leniency that 
Lebanese authorities display when enforcing the law, illustrates the Lebanese state’s spectrum 
from ambiguity to corruption.96 However, the most obstructive aspect of Lebanese legislation 
for Syrian CSOs might be that Syrians are not allowed to found and register organisations of 
their own. Additionally, in line with the general legislation to promote Lebanese employment, 
any local or international CSO on Lebanese territory must be staffed by 90% Lebanese em-
ployees and only up to 10% foreigners – among which Syrians are counted.97 In addition, em-
ployment of Syrians is restricted as they are not issued work permits except for when they get 
a Lebanese sponsor – an option that is closed to many Syrians who are not well acquainted 
with a Lebanese national willing to vouch for them.98 This leaves Syrians in Lebanon with very 
limited lawful means not only to ownership of CSOs, but even to contribute as an employee. 
                                               
90 Cf. Mansour (2017), p. 8. 
91 Cf. Harling/ Simon/ Berthier (2017). 
92 Cf. Mansour (2017), p. 8. 
93 Cf. Harling/ Simon/ Berthier (2017); Mansour (2017), p. 14. 
94 Cf. Beyond Reform & Development/ Transtec (2015), pp. 68-69, 72. 
95 Cf. ibid. p. 68. 
96 Cf. Frangieh (2016), p. 40. 
97 Cf. Mansour (2017), p. 15. 
98 The Lebanese Sponsorship Programme enables Syrians to maintain residency and work legally under certain 
conditions if they have a Lebanese national sponsoring them, which means vouching for them. However, some 
Lebanese turn sponsoring Syrian refugees into a business and demand huge amounts of money in return. cf. Hu-
man Rights Watch (2017). 
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The legal grey area of any Syrian CSO that is not (yet) registered can present difficulties ma-
neuvering in the international system. These range from simple hindrances like the lack of a 
bank account for funding payments to mistrust and a lack of credibility.99 International coun-
tries’ respective antiterrorism legislation demand extra scrutiny when engaging or funding Syr-
ian CSOs or projects; subjecting them to special examinations.100 In order not to violate Leba-
nese policies and donor countries’ formal requirements, potential international partners are 
reluctant to engage with (informal) Syrian initiatives. Instead, they are easily excluded, rather 
than finding a form of collaboration that allows them to play a more active role beyond volun-
teering and to cooperate at eye-level.101 The possibility of registration and international part-
nerships is also what prompts many Syrian CSOs from within the country to move their admin-
istration to Lebanon, as seen in the quantitative overview in chapter 3. However, Lebanese 
legislation still keeps Syrians and thus their CSOs in a legal grey area, reinforcing that Lebanon 
will be nothing more than a temporary home to them. International donors and NPOs, on the 
other hand, do not advocate Lebanese authorities to ease these laws, nor do they take on the 
challenge of supporting Syrian initiatives.102  Instead, they impose their own set of regulations, 
which obstruct newly emerging organisations even more. 
4.3 Economic Context 
With its own complex political agenda and the formal restrictions it imposes, as elaborated in 
the last two sub-chapters, the international donor regime is one of the most influential factors 
for organisations working in the Syrian context. Syrian CSOs have options to generate income 
such as private donations or corporate patrons, yet this is a very limited field. The majority of 
them depend on competing for limited funds from UN bodies and international NPOs, which 
rely on donor countries themselves. As mentioned before, this is a heavily one-sided relation-
ship: Foreign agendas are dictated top-down, with little possibility for local CSOs to influence 
them; potential feedback would have to go up the complete chain of funding, through interme-
diary organisations to reach the large donor body.103 Hence, surfing donor agendas by shaping 
programmes accordingly increases an 20rganization’s chances of securing funding.104 How-
ever, funding cycles are often short-term and only for individual projects, making it hard for 
organisations to plan any long-term programme without having to worry about running out of 
funds.105 Additionally, few donors are willing to provide grants for overhead costs, impeding 
many organisations from being able to guarantee steady employment.106 After all, there are at 
                                               
99 Cf. Mansour (2017), p. 15. 
100 However, reports have shown that this threat is overstated and unsubstantiated allegations are made easily. cf. 
ibid. pp. 2, 14-16.  
101 Cf. ibid. pp. 15-16. 
102 Cf. ibid. p. 16. 
103 Cf. Harling/ Simon/ Berthier (2017). 
104 Cf. ibid. 
105 Cf. Beyond Reform & Development/ Transtec (2015), p. 120. 
106 Cf. Harling/ Simon/ Berthier (2017). 
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least some donor bodies willing to invest in and support 21rganization21i capacities and hu-
man resources with capacity building programmes and 21rganization21i trainings. However, 
these are also often drafted through donors’ lenses instead of being based on an actual needs 
assessment – and moreover they tend to overlook the capacities which are already there and 
are worth being developed further.107 
Naturally, the Syrian CSOs which evolved only in recent years are challenged by the overly 
bureaucratic and hierarchical international system that they are forced to compete in. In return 
for funds, donor bodies demand financial accountability by imposing regulatory standards such 
as monitoring, evaluation and reporting.108 Smaller and rather informal initiatives have an es-
pecially hard time meeting these requirements. By imposing these demands, the donor regime 
can discipline CSOs to concentrate more on technicalities and bureaucracy, rather than on 
actual project implementation, which inevitably increases their spending on administration.109 
In addition, both reporting formalities and complex funding proposal standards are rarely pub-
lished in the Arabic language.110 Hence these requirements pose immense challenges for 
CSOs with limited knowledge of English and scarce human resources. The 21 rganiza-
tion21ized nonprofit landscape in Lebanon poses a competitive environment for qualified and 
experienced human resources and often it is salaries that determine which ones are available 
to an 21rganization.111 Indeed, the nonprofit sector has become one of the most profitable and 
preferred employment sectors in Lebanon because international NPOs or UN bodies can af-
ford to pay their staff big salaries. Therefore it is funding that largely determines not only a 
Syrian CSO’s capacity to work sustainably and implement continuous programmes, but also 
the human resources it can engage and keep. After considering the national and international 
dependencies that Syrian CSOs in Lebanon are subjected to, the rest of this chapter will ex-
amine the society that constitutes them, as employees, volunteers, or beneficiaries. 
4.4 Socio-Economic, Socio-Demographic and Socio-Cultural  
Context 
The socio-economic standard of living of Syrians in Lebanon is a crucial factor for a dignified 
life. Livelihoods are at stake in spite of humanitarian programmes, and many Syrians turn to-
wards the (informal) labour market to support their families in Lebanon and back in Syria. Eco-
nomic needs dictate their lives to an extent that 31% of households decrease expenditures for 
education, with some taking their children out of school or even sending them to work.112 
                                               
107 Cf. Beyond Reform & Development/ Transtec (2015), p. 86. 
108 Cf. Harling/ Simon/ Berthier (2017). 
109 Cf. ibid. 
110 Cf. ibid. 
111 Cf. Beyond Reform & Development/ Transtec (2015), p. 120. 
112 However, rates of 6-14-year-old children enrolled in school in 2017 rose to 70% compared to 52% in 2016 – yet 
many children are over-aged for their grade. cf. United Nationals Children’s Fund/ United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees/ United Nations World Food Programme (2017), p. 79. 
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Further, enrolment of 15-to-24-year-olds in vocational trainings is extremely low, leaving them 
with mostly low-skilled employment opportunities.113  Additionally, the competitive Lebanese 
labour market often forces Syrians to accept lower salaries and exploitative conditions such 
as little workplace safety and no job security.114 While around half of Syrian men in Lebanon 
are working, albeit irregularly, only 7.6% of Syrian women are part of the workforce.115 Higher 
education presents a competitive advantage on the labour market, yet it is a costly investment 
in Lebanon, unaffordable for many. However, Syrians, Lebanese and internationals with aca-
demic degrees still struggle to find employment in Lebanon’s highly competitive labour mar-
ket.116 Thus Syrians in Lebanon in their socio-economically tough situation often have to de-
cide how to spend their time and efforts on the basis of financial considerations. If they volun-
teer, the prospect of a small remuneration presented by INGOs can be a decisive factor. All 
that constitutes a loss of volunteer potential, an unutilised potential of untrained Syrians and a 
brain drain of qualified ones, in favour of well-financed employers and opportunities abroad – 
to the detriment of Syrian CSOs, which are less financially powerful employers. 
The highest geographical concentration of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon is in Baal-
bek-Hermel, Bekaa and Akkar, which are the border regions with Syria that also have the 
highest percentage of informal settlements.117 These tend to be overcrowded and in need of 
repair but are often organised in informal governance structures, which need to be considered 
when providing infrastructure and services.118 While these settlements in the countryside are 
often a last-resort option in the face of saturated rental and labour markets, some newcomers 
choose them deliberately to stay close to social connections.119 Indeed, shelter and employ-
ment are often arranged through extended families.120 Similarly, whole neighborhoods in cities 
like Beirut turned into de facto Syrian settlements.121 Still, the latest UN Vulnerability Assess-
ment shows that safety and respect for human rights are reasons for around a quarter of Syr-
ians in Lebanon to consider moving to a third country, while almost two thirds would return to 
Syria if safety and security improved there. 122  Furthermore, the prospect of accessible 
                                               
113 Cf. ibid. p. 35. 
114 Cf. Errighi/ Griesse (2016), p. 20. 
115 29% of women cite cultural reasons when asked why they are not working. Around a fifth of households are 
headed by females, who tend to be less educated, and of which half do not have a working member. Hence, 
gendered socio-economic vulnerability among Syrians in Lebanon is an important issue, but will not be discussed 
further here to not go beyond the scope of this research. cf. United Nationals Children’s Fund et al (2017). pp. 9-
11, 65, 68-69. 
116 Cf. Dionigi (2016), pp. 31-32. 
117 Cf. ibid. pp. 22-23. 
118 Cf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/ United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2014), 
pp. 8-9. 
119 Cf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/ United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2014), p. 
37. 
120 Cf. ibid, p. 33; Dionigi (2016), p. 8; United Nationals Children’s Fund et al (2017), p. 54. 
121 Lebanese residents in general approve of both rural and urban settlements, as numbers of single males de-
creased with this structural development and so did incidences of street violence. cf. United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees/ United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2014), pp. 8, 54. 
122 Other reasons are better education opportunities in third countries and the high cost of living in Lebanon. cf. 
United Nationals Children’s Fund et al (2017), p. 17. 
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education abroad is one of the reasons why Syrians emigrate from Lebanon.123 Nonetheless, 
only 2% of surveyed households had a member either moving back to Syria or to a third coun-
try.124 Many Syrians are indeed staying in Lebanon in spite of the hardship and the Lebanese 
state’s efforts to remain only a country of transit. This is partly owed to the fact that options for 
resettlement to a third country are very limited, but even more so as many want to stay as 
close to Syria as possible, waiting to return home once conditions there improve.125 
By staying in Lebanon, not only do financial and legal issues keep them worried, but the big-
gest source of insecurity for more than half of displaced Syrians in Lebanon is the neighbours 
and host communities.126 Surveyed Syrians feel that the competition for jobs is the biggest 
factor creating community tensions.127 Naturally, tensions are rising when a demographic 
group has to share their already scarce resources with a growing number of newcomers – 
especially since poorer Lebanese are not eligible for aid services that Syrians are provided 
with.128 The presence of Syrians in Lebanon is increasingly associated with criminality and this 
climate further exacerbates the segregation between both demographic groups and restrains 
Syrians’ daily lives, who often experience harassment and restricted freedom of movement.129 
Still, 87% of surveyed Syrians consider relations with host communities neutral to positive.130 
Indeed, both countries have historical ties due to pre-war Syrian work migration and Syrian 
hospitality for Lebanese refugees during the 2006 Lebanon-Israel war.131 Over the years, 
these relations evolved into tight social networks of extended families of both nationalities.132 
Some Syrians (12%) do consider cultural differences a reason for community tensions, 
whereas others say they appreciate the shared language and culture.133 In conclusion, while 
certain cultural proximity and social security nets alleviate being displaced to Lebanon for Syr-
ians, many demographic and socio-economic factors have the potential to aggravate the lives 
of both Syrians and Lebanese and thus also aggravate their relations. Hence, Lebanese soci-
ety with difficulties of its own might also only present a transitory place of refuge, but both 
countries have a history of migration and solidarity and concomitant social and cultural ties, 
which might prove to be an asset. 
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5. Shapes and Strategies of Syrian Civil Society Organisations in Lebanon 
5.1 Identity 
5.1.1 Syrian, Lebanese and the Diaspora 
There is no one clear identity of Syrian civil society organisations in Lebanon, which is illus-
trated by the variety among the nine organisations that have been interviewed for this research. 
All of them identify themselves as Syrian or, in one case, Syrian-Lebanese, referring to their 
main beneficiaries and the nationalities of their founders and majority of staff. Their founders 
are Syrians (or Syrian-Lebanese), some of whom are refugees to Lebanon who arrived in the 
last seven years, while others left Syria before the current crisis to live in Europe or North 
America.134 This variety reflects the involvement of the wider Syrian diaspora in Syrian CSOs 
in Lebanon as suggested in chapter 3. Many interviewees of organisations working on refugee 
support report that their origins lie in an instantaneous response to the evolving displacement 
crisis, the desire and even sense of duty to help – of the Syrian founders in Lebanon as much 
as in Europe.135 All of the interviewed organisations were founded in 2011 and 2012, except 
for one in 2014, which suggests that events in Syria must have given rise to the non-relief 
CSOs as well. The founder of a CSO doing education on peace-building and human rights 
confirms this, saying that the Syrian revolution inspired their own and other Syrian CSOs, as it 
revived the idea of a Syrian civil society.136 
Official terms have little power over the interviewed organisations’ identity and ownership: All 
of them are registered in Lebanon or a third country and some are managed by Lebanese 
managers, but only to comply with Lebanese law. In the latter cases, the organisations made 
sure to appoint a director who has the same vision as the Syrian founders.137 Lebanon as a 
location constitutes something different for many of the interviewed organisations. Several of 
them merely run projects in Lebanon but have their headquarters abroad, some have other 
branches and activities in Europe or Turkey.138 Two interviewed organisations, which work in-
side Syria, are based in Lebanon for reasons of feasibility of programmes and availability to 
donors. One of them was founded in Syria and just recently moved to Lebanon for security 
reasons. Its programmes still target Syrians from within the country who are participating by 
crossing the border – successfully in most cases.139 Several interviewees do not have a spe-
cific reason as to why they operate in Lebanon and not another neighbouring country, and 
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some consider it a relatively enabling environment.140 These results confirm the tendencies 
that are displayed in the quantitative overview in chapter 3. Syrian civil society organisations 
in Lebanon are closely connected to the ones inside Syria, in other countries of exile and the 
wider diaspora. For the majority, Lebanon is not part of their identity but merely a location to 
work in and from as it is hosting Syrians and bordering Syria. Instead, a clear Syrian identity, 
which might not always be extraverted, is shaped on the basis of the organisations’ main ben-
eficiaries, founders and staff members. 
5.1.2 Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organisations 
While all of the interviewed organisations are registered as an NGO, many of them 25rganizat 
the fact that they cannot just be a movement or an initiative.141 One considers it a painful pro-
cess for a group of activists to adjust their 25rganization to an NGO142 template which comes 
with strict regulations.143 In particular, to be eligible for partnerships and essential funding from 
international donors they have to fit into the international system.144 For some interviewees this 
system is the reason they call their organisations NGOs, others adopt it from their legal title.145 
When asked whether they identified as a CSO, some of the Syrian interviewees negate – for 
the aforementioned politicised concept of civil society in Syria.146 Still, two interviewees specif-
ically call their organisations a CSO regardless of their legal framework, to dissociate them 
from NGOs in Syria, which mostly operate under the regime umbrella and from NGOs in Leb-
anon, which one interviewee calls fake.147 However, two interviewees refer to their organisa-
tions as INGOs as they also have programmes abroad.148 The majority of organisations refer 
to themselves as local, even if they are registered abroad.149 One interviewee elaborates on 
this local identity, saying that their 25rganization grew from grassroots as a volunteer move-
ment and continues to be that, regardless of their rate of growth.150 All interviewed organisa-
tions report growth over time, such as in budget and number of employees, but their local 
identity is also 25rganizati by other interviewees: Many of them were established at a commu-
nity level, even among the ones with exiled European founders, and continue to highly value 
these grassroot origins. Hence, most organisations can be 25rganizati under the term civil 
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society 26rganization, regardless of their legal status, as the majority of them identify more 
with their rather informal grassroots community than with the international NGO landscape. 
5.2 Formality 
5.2.1 Governance 
Many of the Syrian CSOs in Lebanon started as movements and initiatives and reached vary-
ing degrees of formality and professionalism with time. This is exemplified by their different 
types of internal governance. Several interviewees identify a trend of Syrian CSOs emulating 
highly managerial NGOs.151 They recognise an overemphasis on tight management and for-
mal structures and processes, which might be in place due to both the influence of Lebanon’s 
INGO landscape as well as to fulfil donors’ requirements.152 Several interviewees describe the 
aforementioned cycle of establishing new administrative structures to qualify for funding, but 
then having to use the additional funds to finance the administration.153 However, others de-
cide against this: One interviewee explains that their organisation deliberately does not want 
to grow beyond its own scope but instead builds structures and processes slowly and care-
fully.154 Another argues that, operating in such insecure environment, smaller organisations 
can manage unforeseen obstacles and lean periods in funding more easily. 155  Deciding 
against complex administrative structures is not an option to all Syrian CSOs: Several of them 
are just a Lebanese branch with their headquarters outside the country, as seen in chapter 3. 
One interviewee working with such an organisation considers it detrimental to their work in 
Lebanon. They find that the physical distance leads to lack of communication, understanding 
and leadership on the side of management.156 However, the same detachment is described 
with some of the organisations that have offices in Beirut and do field work in camps. Two 
interviewees consider this a hierarchy that perpetuates inequality, in that the benefits of Syri-
ans from within the local community are reaped as field workers or volunteers, while others in 
management positions decide which projects are important enough to be funded.157 
Indeed, many interviewees report increased tensions between people in the field and in head-
quarters due to issues like status and salaries. While one interviewee emphasises that it is a 
convenient practice to blame the administration even for issues that might be beyond their 
control,158 many of the CSOs have strategies to unite the various interests: Two interviewed 
organisations try to harmonise the different perspectives by having a board of volunteers as a 
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counterpart to the executive director. One of these organisations finds it necessary also be-
cause the director is Lebanese and this method not only increases transparency and trust, but 
also gives Syrians involved with an organisation greater ownership of it.159 On the contrary, 
one of the two interviewees expresses that paid staff would ensure a higher efficiency of deci-
sion-making.160 Another organisation, which operates centres, plans for a more decentralised 
administration up to self-governance of these centres.161 All organisations emphasise flat hier-
archies and that decision-making is a democratic process. Many of them use majority votes 
and one organisation’s administration even requires unanimous decisions of the core team.162 
Several of the organisations working in camps and centres have volunteers or field workers 
represented in important meetings, as they are considered the ones able to report whether an 
organisation’s mission and vision are actually implemented on the ground.163 In conclusion, 
governance is a concept constantly evolving with these Syrian CSOs, especially as many of 
them rely on volunteers and continuously master the concomitant challenges such as partici-
pation and power struggles. One interviewee emphasises that Syrians do not have a long 
experience with democracy but that these organisations are their chance to implement it.164 
However, the description of flat hierarchies and shared decision-making by all interviewees 
might have been overly positive and rather disregarding of the problems and efforts that come 
along with it. 
5.2.2 Communication 
A large aspect of bridging the aforementioned gaps between headquarters and work on the 
ground is communication. Many interviewees, in light of the importance assigned to flat hier-
archies, emphasise that their organisation sets great value upon open communication and 
invites people working in the field to the table, taking concerns seriously and having regular 
team building meetings.165 While this sort of transparency is important especially to those 
CSOs aiming to integrate their grassroots members, one interviewee argued for separation: 
Their organisation chooses to not communicate straining administrative aspects to field staff, 
whose daily work is emotionally and mentally exhausting enough. Instead, they provide them 
with psychosocial support.166 With regards to communication channels, convenient messenger 
apps like WhatsApp are used regularly on the ground or between field workers and headquar-
ters. Hence, many of the CSOs choose to communicate selectively and informally, not out of 
neglect but to adapt to the specific context they work in. When coordinating with headquarters 
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abroad, organisations have video calls (which were called tedious) or meetings, which happen 
rarely and only between superiors.167 Communication with donors is via email and has to be 
in English, while internal communication in all but one organisation is completely in Arabic.  
This one CSO uses English in the office, but needs translations in meetings and emails as four 
of their core team members do not speak English.168 Apparently the internationalised system 
in which they manoeuvre looms larger in their administrative practice than the Arabic-speaking 
country they operate in. Of the two organisations’ directors who do not speak any English, one 
considers it not a problem and frequently arranges for translators in meetings with international 
actors.169 In contrast, the other calls it a real challenge and does not consider translation an 
adequate solution but rather calls for the international system to open up to communication in 
Arabic.170 Both communication and governance show Syrian CSOs torn between their local, 
informal and grassroots origins and the international system that they depend on, which would 
need convergence from both sides. While some signs of managerialism can be detected, many 
decide against unrewarding administrative growth and make an effort to involve their base in 
decision-making and to communicate in a supportive and informal way. 
5.3 Human Resources 
5.3.1 Employees 
A crucial resource of Syrian civil society organisations in Lebanon are the people working with 
them, who will therefore be examined more closely.171 Looking at the gender quota of the staff 
of the interviewed organisations, there is a disparity between the field and the office. In the 
field, especially in more conservative areas, female employees are rather rare, except for 
women’s organisations’.172 This reflects women’s reluctance to work for cultural reasons de-
scribed in chapter 4. On the contrary, among managerial employees several organisations 
identify a trend of increasing numbers of women, while two organisations’ 10% quotas chal-
lenge that.173 This shows that there is still progress to be made with regards to gender equality. 
Looking at nationalities, the one interviewed 28rganization identifying as Syrian-Lebanese has 
around 50% of employees from both nationalities, while all others have a share of 60% to 
100% Syrian employees.174 These clear majorities substantiate the Syrian identity and owner-
ship that all organisations describe. Naturally, Syrian-Lebanese tensions are an issue in 
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several of the interviewed organisations, as they reflect the society they are based in. They 
are increased if the CSO’s manager is Lebanese, causing Syrian employees to question their 
status, authority and legitimacy.175 Some Syrian CSOs do not call it a requirement for a poten-
tial employee to be Syrian, while others insist on it: In the face of Syrians’ socio-economic 
difficulties, they want to provide them with a regular salary that gives them minimum security 
and a perspective in Lebanon.176 Organisations operating in camps and centres aim to employ 
only Syrians from within those communities due to their proximity to the field and concomitant 
specific expertise of infrastructure and inhabitants there, as described in chapter 4.177  
However, if all-Syrian employment is only enforced in the field, an inequality will be reproduced, 
which keeps Syrians in the lower-paid field work: Because they have fewer options for employ-
ment, they have to accept jobs with less benefits. However, finding qualified and experienced 
Syrian employees for managerial positions is described as very difficult. That is not to say that 
Syrians in Lebanon are less qualified per se: One interviewee deconstructs this idea by ex-
plaining that many people did attend university in Syria, but were taken out of school by the 
conflict and thus lack the degrees.178 Therefore they experience difficulties both continuing 
their education – in addition to financial obstacles – and entering the professional NPO sector, 
and are thus denied the opportunities to gain relevant experience. The ones that do have de-
grees and/or experience constitute valuable human resources, who many Syrian CSOs lose 
to other employers which can offer better salaries, mostly INGOs. Some interviewees consider 
their own lack of funding for continuous and well-paid salaries the reason they see qualified 
staff leave.179 Additionally, many of the CSOs struggle with employees leaving them to pursue 
their education, most of them abroad.180 Especially scholarship options for higher education 
present an opportunity that few would want to miss, and which therefore constitutes a brain 
drain particularly of already educated Syrians in Lebanon. 
Migration abroad is a crucial aspect for employment of qualified Syrians. The large-scale mi-
gration in 2015 cost several organisations a big share of their staff, to an extent that one 
29rganization lost all team members but one and could not continue its activities until a new 
team was gathered in 2016.181 Yet this is not an issue of the past, as one 29rganization’s rep-
resentative reports that 5 out of their 12 team members left Lebanon in 2017.182 These unam-
biguous accounts contradict the tiny share of Syrians leaving Lebanon shown by the survey 
described in chapter 4, and suggest that the sector of educated and trained Syrians might have 
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more desires and opportunities to leave. Another 30rganization, which had several staff mem-
bers go to Europe, says that they are still being supported by them remotely.183 Hence, this 
migration might further incorporate Syrian CSOs in the larger diaspora, yet it is a constant 
threat to the CSOs operating in Lebanon. Negative effects of this brain drain and concomitant 
turn over are vast and go beyond the exacerbated competition among organisations for quali-
fied personnel: Responsibilities are not taken care of and skills and knowledge are lost. Often, 
such a void negatively impacts the rest of the team who are left trying to cover for the absen-
tees. Such situations are not rare and one interviewee reports that this type of emergency 
situation went on to such an extent that the 30rganization lost track of their grants.184 
Strenuous working conditions are another reason why employees have left the interviewed 
organisations – being overworked due to unlimited overtime and a lot of pressure, but also the 
psychologically overwhelming nature of many organisations’ daily affairs.185 On the other hand, 
several organisations report that their staff could not be kept from working overtime due to their 
non-receding motivation and sense of obligation to work for the Syrian cause.186 One inter-
viewee even calls these excessive efforts an addiction, another considers this sense of duty 
the reason why the majority of their staff has not left the country yet.187 In conclusion, the in-
terviewed organisations’ staff with their significant motivation constitutes an important and re-
liable resource. Tensions between Syrian and Lebanese as well as between field and office 
staff exist, but are not as trying as stretched capacities and mental and emotional strain. Many 
organisations recruit Syrian field workers from the community that they work in, but have to 
compete for qualified and experienced managerial staff. Hence, the majority of the interviewed 
organisations aim to remunerate their human resources – especially the Syrians. While this is 
the ideal, all but one of the interviewed organisations still rely on unpaid volunteers, an im-
portant resource that will be examined hereafter. 
5.3.2 Volunteers 
Around half of the interviewed CSOs which rely on unpaid volunteers do so due to a lack of 
funding, whereas the other half values Syrian volunteers as their connection to the community. 
Syrians from within the community are not only intrinsically motivated to help, but one inter-
viewee describes volunteering on a community level as an activity that can endow meaning 
and make Syrian volunteers feel better in a psychologically difficult situation.188 Many inter-
viewees also describe Syrian volunteers as reliable, but others emphasise their limitations: 
Due to the socio-economically challenging circumstances in Lebanon, only few Syrians can 
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afford to invest their time in charitable activities rather than a paid job. When relying on stu-
dents, organisations have a hard time finding available persons during semester times.189 
Some volunteers demand payment, referring to UN agencies’ practice of remunerating 
them.190 Interviewees also report that there is a high circulation of volunteers due to the fact 
that people start volunteering in hopes of being hired as paid staff but then drop out again after 
realising that this will not happen. To avoid that, several interviewed organisations are trans-
parent about their organisations’ financial situation from the start and pay travel or food allow-
ances if they can afford it.191 Nevertheless, several organisations hire their volunteers once 
they have the financial capacities and thereby strengthen their connection to the community. 
Others emphasise that their organisations have created solid networks of Syrians whom they 
call friends of the organisation, and that these can be relied upon for volunteering as much as 
for crowd-funding.192 
Some of the interviewed organisations consider it increasingly hard to find volunteers: With 
regards to Lebanese, several organisations report that they worked with many Lebanese vol-
unteers in the early days of the Syrian displacement to Lebanon but that their number de-
creased more and more when the emergency situation became normality.193 This shows that 
the close cultural ties and solidarity described in chapter 4 are indeed an asset, but of limited 
sustainability. However, several interviewees comment on the continuous interest of interna-
tional volunteers to work on the Syrian cause: Some CSOs deploy them in projects such as 
English classes, leisure time activities with children or services by medical professionals.194 
Others utilise international students’ and graduates’ expertise by engaging them in administra-
tive work.195 All organisations which have been working with international volunteers consider 
them and the expertise and contacts they bring along as assets, but they are also aware of 
their limitations and thus engage them only in specifically chosen projects: A lack of cultural 
and social understanding can lead to misconduct that can do a lot of harm, especially in vul-
nerable refugee communities, and thus all the interviewed Syrian CSOs prefer in this context 
to work with local volunteers, preferably from within the Syrian community. All interviewed or-
ganisations report having more employees than volunteers and at least two organisations pre-
fer to not have any volunteers at all.196 This is not an argument against civic engagement, but 
rather in favour of remunerating Syrians for their valuable work as they are in a socio-econom-
ically vulnerable situation. Hence, volunteering is a way for Syrian CSOs to further integrate 
into the communities they work with, if they did not already originate from them, and to utilise 
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solidarity and strengthen it. In order to determine the interviewed organisations’ resilience, the 
subsequent chapter of the analysis  highlights the many strategies they adopted to meet the 
challenges they are presented with, which were established in chapter 4. 
5.4 Strategies of Resilience 
5.4.1 Political Pressure 
Any distinctly Syrian activity is subject to Lebanese and international politics. To avoid deter-
ring stakeholders, several of the interviewed CSOs try to contain certain aspects of their “Syr-
ianness.” Several of the interviewed organisations also target beneficiaries other than Syri-
ans.197 While some might have humanitarian reasons, others seem to try to avert Lebanese 
politics’ hostile stance on any 32rganization Syrian activity. One CSO removed the word “Syr-
ian” from their name when registering in Lebanon, to facilitate the process and for fear of ap-
pearing on the radar of security agencies.198 Furthermore, none of the interviewed organisa-
tions take a political stance publicly – some for neutrality as a humanitarian principle, others 
because they would risk 32rganization.199 The interviewee from an 32rganization implement-
ing empowerment and knowledge programmes on civic rights says that they are not working 
on political issues and calls it a coincidence that all members support the Syrian revolution.200 
Neither of the two interviewed CSOs, which offer political education and peace-building goes 
beyond project level to do larger-scale campaigning. All of this indicates that such work is being 
done in Lebanon specifically to reach Syrian citizens there and inside Syria to build capacities 
that are not easily built in an illiberal and war-torn country. With regards to political agendas 
dictating their work, only two of the interviewed CSOs lobby decision-makers in an effort to 
shape their funding agendas and to raise awareness of the Syrian cause in general.201 This 
quota corresponds with the small number of Syrian CSOs doing advocacy in Lebanon identi-
fied in chapter 3. It suggests that Syrian CSOs in Lebanon have little capacity for doing advo-
cacy, expect limited chances of success, and that organisations wanting to advocate the Syrian 
cause might choose a different, more enabling and less politically charged location than Leb-
anon, as their work does not require field work with displaced people or close proximity to 
Syria. 
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5.4.2 Lebanese Legislation 
As has been described, the legal framework for CSOs in Lebanon is obstructive for Syrians, 
as founders and as employees. Initially, several of the interviewed organisations reported that 
they did not see the need for registering as they expected their activities to be necessary only 
temporarily. As it got clearer that the situation was not going to be defused, but aggravated, all 
of them decided to register in some form or another in order to avoid illegality and to enable 
partnerships with donors.202 To do that, the interviewed CSOs chose two ways: Some decided 
to take the trouble to register in Lebanon as some sort of safety net that provides them with 
basic 33uthorization in the eyes of the state, while others decided to register abroad, and some 
of them did both. Several organisations registering abroad did so to obtain certain formality but 
avoid Lebanese legislation and hence expect to be less of a subject to Lebanese authorities’ 
scrutiny.203 Registering in Lebanon, all but one interviewee had to comply with the restrictive 
policies established after 2014 that require Lebanese board members and a Lebanese direc-
tor.204 To bypass this, founders asked Lebanese friends to fill these positions pro forma to 
facilitate the process.205 In spite of the Lebanese authorities’ many restrictions on CSOs, they 
are rather ambiguous in their control. Several interviewees explain, in similar words, that the 
malfunctioning Lebanese state makes it easier to circumvent the law than to comply with it, as 
authorities are not monitoring them. Thus many organisations avoid drawing the authorities’ 
attention to their activities by, among other things, not bothering to officially employ Syrians 
through sponsorship programmes.206 Instead, they forgo employment contracts with their Syr-
ian staff by framing their contribution as external such as that of a consultant, as volunteer 
engagement with an “expense allowance” or as a one time cash-for-work activity – while still 
aiming at their continuous employment. Ergo, all interviewed Syrian CSOs entered the Leba-
nese or an international legal framework to then make use of the latitude in a malfunctioning 
Lebanese state. 
5.4.3 Donors’ Demands 
Large parts of the NGO sector working on the Syrian cause depend financially on funding from 
the international community’s donor regime. As described before, this makes these NGOs 
subject to international agendas and gives them the choice to either surf donor agendas by 
shaping their programmes according to them or to try lobbying them. As has been mentioned 
before, only two of the interviewed organisations do this type of advocacy.207 Most others still 
try to conceptualise projects based on a needs assessment and then find suitable grants. 
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However, they face limitations with regards to duration and continuity.208 Employment is heav-
ily affected by project-based funding, as very few donors cover overhead costs. One 34rgani-
zation’s strategy is to cover certain percentages of their management salaries in each funding 
proposal.209 Other organisations attempt to defy international donors’ monopolistic power by 
broadening their funding portfolio, relying also on private donors: individuals, corporations or 
crowd-funding.210 This provides them with greater sustainability in the face of changing political 
agendas. However, only one 34rganization manages to rely solely on private donations from 
the Syrian exile community and reportedly enjoys long-term and stable funding.211 Additionally, 
several CSOs report having established projects independent of funding. However, none of 
these are generating revenues themselves like a social business would, but are rather small-
scale projects relying on volunteer or pro bono engagement.212 Hence, several organisations 
developed strategies to gain independence from international donors, but they all face finite 
resources and do not really consider more self-sufficient projects. 
5.4.4 Turnover and Migration 
The fourth main challenge posed to Syrian CSOs in Lebanon that has been identified in this 
research is the large-scale migration of (potential) employees and concomitant staff turnover. 
In order to limit the damage of managerial staff leaving their organisations, many interviewees 
turn to elaborate mechanisms: One interviewee reports that their organisation aims at proper 
documentation and archiving in case an employee leaves or responsibilities are redistrib-
uted.213 Many of the interviewed organisations’ managerial teams are small and often a de-
partment consists of only one person, who takes their knowledge with them when they leave. 
Hence two of the interviewed organisations over time developed a system of manuals with 
guidelines, written policies and best practice templates for certain tasks and processes to con-
serve the modus operandi of individual departments.214 This type of knowledge management 
is crucial to preserve important content and facilitate onboarding. One interviewed executive 
director has established a system which they call shadow management: Their organisation 
takes on extra volunteers who are trained by following the paid staff around and thus get to 
know the organisation, the procedures and tasks, so that the organisation has backups to 
resort to in case an employee leaves.215 Regarding qualification in general, several organisa-
tions report using the opportunities to send their staff to external trainings or capacity building 
seminars offered by donors or their partners. However, these interviewees said that few of 
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these opportunities are offered and the ones that are might not be relevant to their work.216 
Hence, as an answer to the shortage of qualified Syrian employees, many of the interviewed 
organisations turn to training them themselves in order to transform inexperienced novices into 
valuable human resources. 
The majority of the interviewed organisations have a training approach that resembles an ap-
prenticeship, in which they take on inexperienced Syrian staff and coach them while working 
with them. “Trainees” are explained how to execute tasks until they can do them themselves, 
which one interviewee describes as effortful and time-consuming, but effective.217 Another or-
ganisation integrates them into several different departments for them to acquire a whole set 
of skills and as much practical experience as possible.218 One interviewee also considers this 
training approach rewarding and adds that it creates a relation among the organisation’s staff 
members and gives the new members the feeling that the organisation cares for them and 
gives them something in return.219 The interviewed organisations which offer political and civic 
education programmes qualify their new teaching staff members by sending them to their own 
trainings as participants.220 One interviewee emphasises that it is an important organisational 
strategy to rather nurture and expand the skills of people who show great potential instead of 
employing people who already have qualifications.221 Several emphasise that these efforts are 
worthwhile in spite of their experience and continuous threat of the newly qualified human 
resources leaving the organisation, due to lack of funding or personal motives. On the contrary, 
all interviewees even utter their sympathy and understanding for especially younger Syrians’ 
migration and one executive director emphasises their organisation’s practice of providing 
them with recommendation letters to increase their chances of finding employment else-
where.222 Hence, in spite of migration being a detrimental factor for Syrian CSOs in Lebanon, 
they still find great potential in the human resources available to them and actively work on 
training Syrians in Lebanon themselves. The importance of the capacities which these organ-
isations are building thereby will be examined subsequently. 
 
5.4.5 Civil Society Capacity Building 
Especially in the face of a quasi non-existing Syrian civil society before 2011 and the national 
and international restrictions which they experience in Lebanon, the interviewed Syrian CSOs 
show remarkable efforts to give something back to the members of this new civil society. 
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Several interviewed CSOs consider the capacity building of their employees as well as volun-
teers an investment in the Syrian community.223 Many also emphasise that this investment and 
the skills conveyed through the organisations’ work go beyond professional life: The majority 
of the interviewed organisations state that they also educate their staff with regards to human 
rights, democracy, or gender awareness.224 Two interviewees report that they feel a lack of 
teamwork among Syrians in general and presume that working in such organisations can help 
develop these skills.225 Indeed, one interviewee tells that their 36rganization is actively invest-
ing in collaboration through team building measures and works to strengthen the sense of 
community through team outings and reflection and psychosocial support meetings.226 Inte-
grating the various hierarchical levels in an 36rganization might also bear the chance to bring 
various Syrian communities and social classes closer together.  
Indeed, interviewees imply that the Syrian CSOs in Lebanon are inducing a certain sense of 
belonging. One interviewee explains that they create communities of Syrians who share the 
same mentality and beliefs, albeit establishing bonds within organisations and not among 
them. He considers NGO politics, the lack of networking and coordination and their competition 
with each other factors that drive these communities apart.227 One interviewee concludes that 
while many of the beneficiaries as well as the employees of CSOs in Lebanon only see the 
country as a place of temporary stay, their time there presents a unique chance to work with 
such organisations, to participate in trainings and empower themselves.228 This type of capac-
ity building is an opportunity specifically for Syrians in exile, as the same activities would be 
heavily restricted inside Syria – albeit some territories more than others. In conclusion, Syrian 
civil society organisations in Lebanon bring forth a group of Syrians with distinct expertise in 
the nonprofit sector and foster a new form of democratic culture and civic values inside their 
institution and closer environment. However, time will tell whether these organisations will unite 
to become one Syrian civil society, and which role it might play in the future. 
 
5.5 Potential Future Scopes 
When asked about the future of their CSOs, none of the interviewees see their commitment 
coming to an end with an end to the war in Syria. In the face of both a Lebanese and an 
international political shift towards reconstruction and refugees’ return to Syria, all of them 
consider working in Syria, either adding activities inside the country or even moving the whole 
organisation there. However, many underline that such a move would be subject to certain 
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political factors, such as the freedom to conduct their activities without surveillance and re-
strictions.229 Another interviewee emphasises that a move to Syria is ineligible for organisa-
tions with an overtly political stand against the current Syrian regime if it were still in power in 
a post-war Syria, not least because they would not be able to get permission to work.230 Others 
also express their intent to continue their work in Lebanon as they expect ongoing need for 
support there – one organisation has a ten-year plan for their work in Lebanon.231 However, 
another interviewee emphasises that any type of long-term strategy is impossible to draft as 
the situation is insecure and dependent on international actors and relations.232 Still, another 
interviewee calls moving the organisation to Syria one day a sustainable vision for their CSO 
and considers it a continuous motivation for all employees.233  
One interviewee presumes a rather pessimistic future of current Syrian civil society in Lebanon; 
saying that its work there can give a certain sense of purpose for the time being, but that these 
organisations do not build something relevant for a future back in Syria. The interviewee con-
siders the country to be torn by war into differently controlled and thus influenced areas that 
are unable to develop one civil society, albeit acknowledging the organisations’ shared beliefs 
and ideals as an asset.234 These are brought up by many interviewees and unify all interviewed 
organisations in their common vision of a democratic Syria. One interviewee also mentions the 
fact that the purpose of relief and development-related organisations should be to make them-
selves redundant and that they can therefore imagine moving their focus of activity to other 
relevant fields later.235 Hence, Syrian civil society organisations consider themselves relevant 
to the reconstruction of their country, no matter their current mission. Very few of the inter-
viewed organisations have a concrete plan for the future but are rather undetermined with 
regards to geographical and thematic fields of work. Still, many anticipate their future to be 
inside Syria or the Syrian-Lebanese context rather than other countries of exile. Hence, it is 
their shared vision of a Syria based on democratic and civic values that unites them and might 
prove to be sustainable beyond exile, as time goes on. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
6.1 Summary of Core Findings 
Syrians are a resilient people indeed, judging by their time in Lebanese exile. After their own 
state failed them, they depend on their host country and the international community. Both of 
these, and their partner NGOs, fail to live up to their responsibilities and leave Syrians in Leb-
anon to some extent unprotected and uncared for. Syrians’ unmet needs make a strong case 
for them to self-organise in order to provide for themselves, and, indeed, a large share of the 
examined Syrian CSOs in Lebanon respond to their community’s socio-economic needs. Fur-
thermore, Syrian CSOs in Lebanon also engage in socio-political activities and education, 
which reflect the political dimension of the Syrian cause beyond support for the displaced. 
However, noticeably few of them engage in advocacy – potentially due to the politically 
charged environment in Lebanon – which might leave them subject to others’ agendas. The 
examined CSOs are also compelled to withhold their Syrian identity and political stances for 
the sake of functioning in the Lebanese and international context. When faced with restrictive 
Lebanese regulations, they rely on the state’s malfunction and act on their mission in spite of 
its conflicting nature by, for instance, employing Syrians anyway. In contrast, the international 
donor system is more difficult to circumvent: A dependency on funding impacts some Syrian 
CSOs to such an extent that they need to fulfil formal structural and procedural requirements, 
in some cases even shape their programmes according to (contradictory) donor agendas – 
and still depend on only limited and often conditional support. 
Contrary to monetary resources, Syrian CSOs in Lebanon can draw on reliable human re-
sources. Most of their founders, employees and volunteers are from within the wider Syrian 
community. Being located in Lebanon is less of a factor of identity, than of necessity: Syrians 
cornered inside their country can be accessed via Lebanon, Syrians in Lebanon are in need 
as well, and many of them simply have nowhere else to go. Nevertheless, Lebanese citizens 
(and internationals) have been engaged with Syrian CSOs when they needed a helping hand. 
Still, these organisations’ principal and inexhaustible resource is Syrians, as they can rely on 
their motivation, loyalty, sense of duty and endurance. However, socio-economic concerns 
and the prospect of better opportunities abroad limit the group of Syrians in Lebanon available 
for financially weak Syrian CSOs to the rather inexperienced and untrained. The majority of 
the interviewed organisations still commit to Syrians in Lebanon not only as beneficiaries, but 
also as staff. That way they provide a perspective to a socio-economically vulnerable popula-
tion and create something more: They train their human resources while working with them 
and thereby build not only professional abilities, but also capabilities for teamwork and demo-
cratic decision-making, and awareness of civic and human rights, gender equality and more. 
In doing so, the capacities that they create are not limited to Lebanese exile, but can be 
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transferred into a larger Syrian civil society (and other fields therein). But the fact that they 
created them there, under such challenging conditions in a place that keeps reminding them 
that it is only transitory, demonstrates their strength. 
In Lebanese exile, Syrian civil society organisations can evade their own restrictive regime to 
a certain extent, yet they still have to resist many other forms of repression. While being able 
to operate relatively free, their potential is not properly supported and sponsored. Instead of 
actually influencing the national and international politics that shape Syrians’ daily lives as 
much as the future of their country, CSOs are kept busy struggling with organisational politics 
and a dependency on donor’s demands and paternalistic positions. Thereby a chance is fore-
gone to empower Syrian agents in Lebanon and foster their engagement in a local civil society 
instead of seeing them migrate back and forth. In spite of this, the organisations rely on a 
powerful resource: Crucial work is being done on the ground by the many unpaid or underpaid 
Syrians. Embedded in dire socio-economic conditions in Lebanon, Syrians’ volunteer engage-
ment might be more of a mere necessity of cheap labour than an opportunity to build bridging 
social capital, especially as religious and ethnic segmentation might be reproduced in the dis-
placement of whole communities. Strenuous working conditions might also inhibit the formation 
of democratic organisational cultures and structures. Therefore, much of the organisations’ 
assumed functions with regards to political deliberation and the formation of social cohesion 
has yet to be further investigated. However, what many of the interviewees in this research 
confirmed was that this surge of Syrian civil society in Lebanese exile coincided with a socio-
political awakening, originated in the peaceful 2011 protests. This development includes Syri-
ans taking a political stance and voicing it, demanding the attention of a global public to have 
their needs taken care of and their concerns taken seriously, educating and getting educated, 
holding their and other governments accountable, creating their own public sphere and actively 
planning the future of their country, and fostering democracy in exile if they are deprived of it 
in their own state. 
6.2 Reflection of the Research 
This research made clear that there is no one typical Syrian civil society 39rganization in Leb-
anon by showing the pluralism in the sector. The data collected does not allow for a compara-
tive quantitative analysis but rather depicts variety and different trends. However, such analy-
sis, based on a more detailed mapping, could give valuable insight into group-specific charac-
teristics: It could detect differences between service providing organisations and politically en-
gaged ones, or between the ones with headquarters in Lebanon and the ones with only pro-
jects there, with regards to criteria such as governance, funding, or human resources. Yet, 
such data collection and evaluation would have gone beyond the scope of this research. It 
neither allowed for field observations to get a second account of the interviewed organisations’ 
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operations and therefore relies on the interviewees’ objectivity and accuracy. Furthermore, it 
is based on a lot of grey literature, which implicates certain unreliability, as it depends on cur-
rent developments of a rapidly changing context. Two of the interviews were conducted in 
Arabic with English translation, which might present a source of error, and the same is true for 
the other interviewees who spoke in a language that is not their mother tongue. Lastly, this 
research was conducted by someone from outside the Syrian context. Theoretical concepts 
consulted have a Western perspective and field research was shaped through a European 
lens, resulting in certain aspects possibly not being disclosed to the author of this paper. 
6.3 Outlook 
Time will tell whether the Syrian civil society organisations which emerged in Lebanese exile 
will contribute to a larger Syrian civil society. Thus far, migration has proven to be a rather 
detrimental factor for them, but it might also present an opportunity to interweave the various 
exiled communities with each other. This research also identifies a lack of intermediary or 
umbrella organisations, and a need for community-building and networking among the organ-
isations. Therefore an even broader, transnational Syrian civil society might either pose a 
threat of dispersal, or the chance to build alliances throughout the diaspora. Such initiatives 
are being established, for instance the We Exist! advocacy alliance, but the whole field de-
serves special attention.236 Another aspect of migration is return: Some of the human re-
sources who left Lebanon might come back soon, perhaps well-educated, and possibly en-
hance the CSO sector. Others return to Syria, for which political agendas and deceptive rhet-
oric are pushing.237 However, these might not return to a life with less needs, but rather to a 
situation in which they are even less accessible to civil society activities of any kind. 
Indeed, in spite of its vast restrictions on Syrian CSOs, Lebanon is still a more enabling envi-
ronment than Syria. Nevertheless, this research shows that many Syrian CSOs in Lebanese 
exile share the vision of moving (or returning) there one day. NPOs providing relief work to 
have eventually made themselves redundant, so they could then potentially be active in other 
relevant fields. In fact, this research indicates that Syrian CSOs in Lebanon are united beyond 
their current mission by the democratic and civic values they have been promoting. However, 
whether these organisations will actually be able to establish themselves in Syria will depend 
on security concerns and political conditions, not only for the politically active or affiliated 
CSOs. Hence, to create a sustainable environment for civil society to thrive, Syrians will not 
only need an end to the war, but political efforts to guarantee human rights, justice and ac-
countability. The quotation from Yassin al-Haj Saleh in this paper’s introduction continues as 
                                               
236 Cf. Citizens for Syria e.V. (2017b). 
237 Syrians returning do so mostly after being internally displaced, but for each of them three more were newly 
displaced due to continuous violence. Furthermore, it is not always clear whether those returning (from outside the 
country) do so voluntarily. cf. Ratcliffe (2018). 
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follows: “We are hopeful that more people will join us in this struggle. It is not just about Syria 
any longer. It is about the world.”238 Clearly, whether the world stands with Syria will also be 
decisive for the future of its civil society. 
                                               
238 Yassin al-Haj Saleh, as cited in: Hussain/ Hisham (2016). 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. List of 72 Syrian Civil Society Organisations in Lebanon 
Name of Organisation Identified in the register of 
Abni Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Ahl Network Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Al Caravan Rawabet 
Alan Revolutionary movement Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Alpha Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Alpha & Bet/ Alphabet for Alternative  
Education 
Citizens for Syria e.V., Welander 
Alshar3 Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Ataa Relief Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Basmeh & Zeitooneh  Citizens for Syria e.V., Rawabet, Welander 
Bdna Caporeh Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Bidayat Citizens for Syria e.V., Rawabet 
C.A.A Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Centre for Civil Society and Democracy 
Syria 
Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Centre for Syrian Freedoms Welander 
Consultancy Commission for Syrian Refu-
gees 
Rawabet 
Cord  Welander 
Damma Hug Rawabet 
Dawlaty  Citizens for Syria e.V., Rawabet 
De yalla Welander 
Decostamine Initiative Rawabet, Welander 
Dirasat Welander 
Dubarah Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Ettijahat-Independent Culture 
(ةلقتسم ةفاقث . تاهاجتا) 
Rawabet 
Farik Beirut Welander 
Floka Freedom Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Future View Welander 
Generation Freedom Welander 
Ghiras Al Amal / Grass of Hope Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Girath al-Nahda Welander 
Hamzet Wasel Rawabet 
Ibda’at for Charity and Relief 
(ةثاغلإاو ريخلل تاعادبإ) 
Rawabet 
Inab Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Jusoor – Syrians Forward Together  Citizens for Syria e.V., Rawabet, Welander 
Kayany Foundation Welander 
Khayr Charity Foundation Welander 
Lamsat Ward Citizens for Syria e.V., Rawabet, Welander 
Mobaderoon Citizens for Syria e.V., Welander 
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Mulham Volunteering Team Citizens for Syria e.V., Welander 
Multi Aid Programs (MAPS) Rawabet 
Najda Now – Syria Citizens for Syria e.V., Rawabet Welander 
Nuon Organization for Peace-Building 
(ملاسلا ءانبل نون ةمظنم) 
Rawabet, Welander 
Olive Branch Organization Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Palestinian-Syrian Bond Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Rahma Relief foundation Citizens for Syria e.V. 
RSM Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Rûşêr Network Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Sawa for Development and Aid Citizens for Syria e.V., Rawabet, Welander 
SDCCS Welander 
SEMA Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Shafak Syria Organization Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Sharq for Citizen Development Rawabet 
Sonbola Citizens for Syria e.V., Rawabet, Welander 
Spark of March  Welander 
SYAN Welander 
Syrian Anamel Welander 
Syrian Business Club Welander 
Syrian Center for Policy Research Citizens for Syria e.V., Rawabet 
Syrian Civil Coalition Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Syrian Eyes (ةيروس نويع) Citizens for Syria e.V., Rawabet, Welander 
Syrian League for Citizenship Rawabet, Welander 
Syrian Medical Relief Office 
Rawabet 
 )يروسلا يبطلا يثاغلإا بتكملا( 
Syrian National Media Welander 
Syrian Relief Network Rawabet 
The Butterfly Effect Citizens for Syria e.V. 
The Nawaya Network Rawabet 
UOSSM Citizens for Syria e.V. 
USYCSO Citizens for Syria e.V. 
Watan Citizens for Syria e.V., Welander 
Women Now for Development Citizens for Syria e.V., Welander 
Yasmine Syria Welander 
Youth League of Saadnoye Welander 
Union of Relief and Development Associa-
tions 
(ةّيثاغلإا تايعمجلا داحتا) 
Rawabet 
 
 
Cf. Citizens for Syria e.V. (2017a); Hamzet Wasel (2017); Welander (2015). 
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Appendix 2. List of 39 Categorised Syrian CSOs in Lebanon 
 
Name 
Domain of 
Work 
Second Domain 
of Work 
Presence in 
Lebanon 
Headquar-
ters abroad 
in 
Abni 
Political Organi-
sation 
Civic & Advocacy 
Organisation 
Headquarters   
Ahl Network 
Education & Re-
search 
Development & 
Housing 
Headquarters   
Alan Revolutionary 
Movement 
Political Organi-
sation 
  Branch Aleppo 
Alpha 
Emergency & 
Relief 
Development & 
Housing 
Headquarters   
Alpha & Bet 
Education & Re-
search 
Child Welfare & 
Services, Day 
Care 
Headquarters   
Alshar3 
Media & Com-
munication 
Development & 
Housing 
Branch France 
Ataa Relief 
Emergency & 
Relief 
Development & 
Housing 
Branch Turkey 
Basmeh & 
Zeitooneh 
Emergency & 
Relief 
Education & Re-
search 
Headquarters   
Bdna Caporeh Social Services 
Education & Re-
search 
Headquarters   
Bidayyat Civil Association 
Grantmaking 
Foundation 
Headquarters   
C.A.A 
Emergency & 
Relief 
Development & 
Housing 
Branch Damascus 
CCSDS Civil Association 
Adult/Continuing 
Education 
Branch Turkey 
Dawlty Project Civil Association 
Advocacy Organi-
sation 
Headquarters   
Dubarah 
Education & Re-
search 
  Branch Qatar 
Floka Freedom 
Emergency & 
Relief 
Health Branch Al Ladhiqiyah 
Ghiras Al Amal/ 
Grass of Hope 
Education & Re-
search 
Child Welfare & 
Services, Day 
Care 
Branch Rif Dimashq 
Inab Civil Association   Headquarters   
Jusoor 
Education & Re-
search 
Development & 
Housing 
Headquarters   
Lamsat Ward 
Development & 
Housing 
Civil Rights 
Association 
Headquarters   
Mobaderoon 
Development & 
Housing 
Education & Re-
search 
Branch Damascus 
Mulham Voluntee-
ring Team 
Emergency & 
Relief 
Education & Re-
search 
Branch Jordan 
Najdeh Now 
Emergency & 
Relief 
  Headquarters   
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Olive Branch Orga-
nization 
Education & Re-
search 
Emergency & Re-
lief 
Branch Dar’a 
Palestinian-Syrian 
Bond 
Human Rights Rule of Law Headquarters   
Rahma Relief foun-
dation 
Emergency & 
Relief 
Development & 
Housing 
Branch Al Ladhiqiyah 
RSM Civil Association Human Rights Headquarters   
Rûşêr Network 
Development & 
Housing 
  Branch Aleppo 
Sawa for Develop-
ment & Aid 
Education & Re-
search 
Emergency & Re-
lief 
Headquarters   
SEMA 
Emergency & 
Relief 
Adult/Continuing 
Education 
Branch Turkey 
Shafak Syria Orga-
nization 
Emergency & 
Relief 
Health Branch Turkey 
Sonbola 
Education & Re-
search 
Child Welfare & 
Services, Day 
Care 
Headquarters   
Syrian Civil Coali-
tion 
Development & 
Housing 
Networking & 
Cooperation 
Branch Turkey 
Syrian Eyes 
Emergency & 
Relief 
Food Security & 
Livelihood 
Headquarters   
The Butterfly Effect Social Services 
Education & Re-
search 
Headquarters   
The Syrian Center 
for Policy Research 
Research 
Social Sciences & 
Policy Studies 
Headquarters   
UOSSM Health Field Hospitals Branch Turkey 
USYCSO 
Development & 
Housing 
Education & Re-
search 
Branch Turkey 
Watan Civil Association 
Education & Re-
search 
Branch Turkey 
Women Now for 
Development 
Development & 
Housing 
Women Protection Branch Turkey 
 
Cf. Citizens for Syria e.V. (2017a). 
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